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ABSTRACT
In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance
the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure. We show within
a simple model how competition for repayment between lenders may result in sovereign debt that
is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. Alleviating this inefficiency requires a sovereign
debt restructuring mechanism that fulfills some of the functions of corporate bankruptcy regimes,
in particular the enforcement of seniority and subordination clauses in debt contracts.
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ojeanne@imf.org1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The composition of sovereign debt and how it aﬀects debt restructuring nego-
tiations in the event of ﬁnancial distress, has become a central policy issue in
recent years. There are two major reasons why the spotlight has been turned
on this question. First, the change in the I.M.F.’s policy orientation towards
sovereign debt crises, with a proposed greater weight on ‘private sector involve-
ment’ (Rey Report, G-10, 1996), has brought up the question of how easy it
actually is to get ‘the private sector involved’; that is, how easy it is to get
private debt-holders to agree to a debt restructuring. Second, the experience
with several recent debt restructuring episodes - some of which were followed
by defaults and by private litigation to recover debt payments - have raised
concerns that the uncoordinated eﬀorts of dispersed debt-holders to renegotiate
sovereign debt obligations were likely to lead to substantial delays and other
ineﬃciencies.
These concerns have led a number of prominent commentators, a majority
of G-7 countries, and the I.M.F. to advocate ex-post policy interventions to
facilitate debt restructuring (see Rogoﬀ and Zettelmeyer, 2002, for a history and
overview of the diﬀerent proposals). These calls for intervention have reached
a culmination point when the I.M.F.’s Anne Krueger put forward the idea of a
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) inspired by the U.S. corporate
bankruptcy reorganization law under Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy act
(Krueger, 2002).
The debate triggered by these ambitious proposals for reform of the interna-
tional ﬁnancial architecture has left many commentators wondering why, in the
ﬁrst place, sovereign debt had been structured to make it diﬃcult to renegoti-
ate, and why the structure of sovereign debt had evolved over the past decade
or so towards a greater share of sovereign bond issues and greater dispersion
2of ownership of sovereign bonds. This paper is concerned with precisely these
issues. Its starting point are the questions:
1) why would a forward looking sovereign want to design a sovereign debt
structure that is diﬃcult to restructure?
2) where are the contractual failures between the borrower and lenders that
justify an ex-post policy intervention to facilitate debt restructuring?
Several commentators (Dooley, 2000; Shleifer, 2003) have argued that due
to the sovereign’s incentive to repudiate its debts (the well known willingness-
to-pay problem)i tm a yb ee x - a n t ee ﬃcient to structure sovereign debt to make
it diﬃcult to renegotiate ex-post. A policy intervention that aims to reduce
these restructuring costs, while improving ex-post eﬃciency, might thus under-
mine ex-ante eﬃciency. Such a policy would have the eﬀect of raising the cost
of borrowing and would result in a reduction of lending to emerging market
countries1.
Our paper considers another moral hazard problem besides the sovereign’ s
willingness-to-pay: the problem of debt dilution. This problem arises whenever
a sovereign approaching ﬁnancial distress raises new debt mainly in an eﬀort
to delay the onset of a debt crisis. This new debt dilutes existing debt by
reducing the amount that can be recovered by existing debtholders in a debt
renegotiation.
Our paper argues that this form of debt dilution is diﬃcult to avoid in
sovereign lending, as there is no obvious way of structuring legally binding
seniority agreements nor of enforcing priority of repayment following a sovereign
debt default. In contrast to corporate debt, for which courts routinely enforce
creditors’ subordination priorities, there is no easy way of enforcing priority
1The idea that under limited enforcement it may be desirable to create a debt structure
that is diﬃcult to renegotiate is, of course, a familiar theme in corporate ﬁnance. See, for
example Hart and Moore (1995), Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Bolton and Scharfstein
(1996), Diamond and Rajan (2001) and Diamond (2004).
3covenants for sovereign debt2. As a result, our paper argues that when seniority
is not available de jure, sovereigns attempt to achieve it de facto by making
their debt issues exceedingly diﬃcult to restructure. With each new debt issue,
the sovereign is tempted to lower the cost of borrowing by commiting to high
future restructuring costs of that particular issue, which encourage the sovereign
to restructure ﬁrst other debts with lower restructuring costs, and thus provide
a form of seniority to that issue. This de facto seniority can be obtained in
various ways, for example by lifting sovereign immunity, by widely dispersing
the debt and insisting on a unanimity requirement for restructuring the debt,
by lowering the maturity of the debt, by denominating the debt in dollars, or
by inserting acceleration clauses. Thus, in the absence of legal enforcement of
seniority, a form of Gresham law for sovereign debt arises – where “bad” debt
structures, with ineﬃciently high ex-post restructuring costs, tend to crowd out
“good” debt, that is easier to renegotiate in the event of ﬁnancial distress.
Our paper argues that there is, therefore, a role for policy intervention in
sovereign lending that would improve both ex-ante and ex-post eﬃciency. This
policy intervention should take the form of facilitating the enforcement of pri-
ority covenants, thus allowing sovereigns to issue debt that is both easier to
renegotiate and of longer maturity. Thus, our theory has some implications for
the reforms of the international ﬁnancial architecture that have been discussed
in recent debates, and in particular the desirability of a bankruptcy regime for
sovereigns (SDRM). We argue that because of the competition between borrow-
2T h e r ei sal a r g ec o r p o r a t eﬁnance and legal literature, as well as a large body of case law, on
debt seniority and priority covenants as instruments aimed at reducing the risk of debt dilution
(see e.g. Fama and Miller, 1972, White 1980, Barclay and Smith, 1995, and Schwartz, 1989
and 1997). The insights from the corporate ﬁnance literature cannot be directly transposed to
sovereign debt. The seniority of corporate debt is explicit, contractually speciﬁed and enforced
by courts. It is based to a large extent on collateral. In contrast, there is very little collateral
that sovereigns can oﬀer to creditors. Of the 79 developing and emerging market countries that
had at least one public sector international loan or bond outstanding on January 1, 2003, the
face value of collateralized debt was only 6.2 percent of the face value of total outstanding debt
(Zettelmeyer, 2003). See also Chalk (2002) and IMF (2003) for discussions of collateralized
sovereign debt.
4ers to dilute each other, sovereign debt might be excessively hard to restructure
in equilibrium even from an ex ante perspective. A bankruptcy regime for
sovereigns could mitigate this ineﬃciency by enforcing a default seniority rule,
where priority is based on a ﬁrst-in-time rule whereby debts issued earlier have
higher priority, and debts with longer maturity have higher priority3.
In our model, the contractual approach to sovereign debt restructuring re-
cently endorsed by the G-104, which is limited to an encouragement to issuers
to allow for majority-rule clauses for the restructuring of debt issues (so-called
collective action clauses or CACs) does not work. First, eﬃciency cannot be
achieved by leaving sovereign borrowers free to include or not renegotiation-
friendly clauses in their debt. In equilibrium, the adoption of such clauses will
be ineﬃciently low under laissez-faire. Second, it is also not desirable to encour-
age the adoption of such clauses by a system of taxes or subsidies (as advocated
by Eichengreen, 1999, or Kenen, 2001), or by making their use mandatory,
because this intervention would only result in higher borrowing costs without
addressing in any way the debt dilution problem.
Our analysis provides support for the statutory approach to sovereign debt
restructuring5. However, we emphasize that the statutory approach may easily
be welfare-reducing if it is not carefully designed. In particular, a sovereign
debt restructuring mechanism that simply solves coordination failures between
creditors ex post reduces welfare in our model. It is crucial that the mechanism
fulﬁll the other functions of corporate bankruptcy regimes, in particular that
it establish legal seniority between creditors and that it allow for the analog
of debtor-in-possession lending to the defaulted sovereign. Our emphasis on
3The ﬁrst-in-time rule has been advocated for corporate debt, among others, by White
(1980) and Schwartz (1989). Bolton and Skeel (2004) outline how a bankruptcy procedure for
sovereigns could be designed to legally enforce such a priority rule.
4The contractual approach advocated by the oﬃcial sector is outlined in G-10 (1996) and
G-22 (1998).
5The statutory approach advocated by the IMF is outlined in Krueger (2002). The rela-
tionship with chapter 11 under the U.S. bankruptcy code is discussed in Bolton (2003).
5the need for diﬀerentiating across creditors in the debt restructuring process
contrasts with the conventional wisdom that creditors should be treated equally
in debt restructuring agreements (G-10, 1996; G-22, 1998).
Related Literature.
A number of authors have emphasized the importance of seniority in sov-
ereign debt. Roubini and Setser (2004), for example, view “the absence of an
enforceable priority structure for the sovereign’s own debt” as “one of the basic
problems [...] that arise in a debt restructuring”. Dooley (2000) emphasizes the
conﬂict between oﬃcial and private lenders in the competition for repayment,
i.e., the question of the seniority of the oﬃcial sector. As documented in section
2, practioners pay a great deal of attention to the implicit seniority status of
the diﬀerent types of sovereign debt.
By comparison, the formal analysis of seniority in sovereign debt is rela-
tively underdeveloped. Kletzer (1984) analyzes the equilibrium of the sovereign
debt market when creditors do not observe the borrower’s total indebtedness.
Cohen (1991, chapter 4) presents a 3-period model of sovereign debt dilution
and notes that the resulting ineﬃciency is aggravated by the absence of a bank-
ruptcy regime for sovereigns. Detragiache (1994) ventures that the lack of for-
mal seniority in sovereign debt, although a potential source of ineﬃciency, may
paradoxically help in disciplining sovereigns from playing creditors against each
other in debt restructuring negotiations. Tirole (2002, chapter 4) discusses the
contracting externalities that may arise in the issuance of sovereign debt and
mentions seniority as a possible solution to this problem.
The ineﬃciencies resulting from nonexclusivity in debt contracts have long
b e e nn o t e di nt h ec o r p o r a t eﬁnance literature. Fama and Miller (1972, chapter
4) provide an early discussion of how lenders can protect themselves from dilu-
tion by making their loans senior. White (1980) and Schwartz (1989) analyze
6how priority rules can protect against dilution. Bizer and DeMarzo (1992), on
the other hand, show that seniority is not a perfect antidote to the nonexclusiv-
ity problem in the presence of debtor’s moral hazard. Bisin and Rampini (2004)
provides an analysis of bankruptcy regimes that is related to ours. In their
paper, the institution of bankruptcy is welfare-improving because it alleviates
the incentives problem resulting from the non-exclusivity of ﬁnancial contracts.
It achieves this beneﬁt, furthermore, by enforcing the seniority of early lenders.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews some stylized facts on
sovereign debt that motivate the theoretical analysis in the rest of the paper.
Section 3 gives the main assumptions of the model. Section 4 shows how the
nonrenegotiability of debt can make it eﬀectively senior. Sections 5 and 6 ana-
lyze the equilibrium when the government respectively can and cannot commit
not to dilute its debt. Section 7 shows how non-renegotiable debt can be used to
forestall dilution, as well as the eﬃciency costs involved. Section 8 draws some
normative implications from the theory, highlighting in particular the welfare
beneﬁts of establishing de jure seniority in sovereign debt.
2E v i d e n c e
This section presents evidence suggesting that there is an implicit seniority
structure for sovereign debt, and that this structure is related to the perceived
diﬃculty with which debt can be restructured. The implicit seniority in sov-
ereign debt is an understudied topic, on which there has been very little em-
pirical research. This section relies mainly on the facts reported in Zettelmeyer
(2003) as well as the ﬁnancial press.
The de facto seniority structure of sovereign debt is, for one thing, apparent
from the diﬀerent treatment of diﬀerent classes of creditors in a default. The
diﬀerential treatment of claims has been a characteristic of most debt restruc-
7turings that have taken place over the last 25 years (beginning with the debt
renegotiations and write-downs of the 1980s and the Brady plan and continuing
with the more recent debt restructurings in Russia, Ukraine, Pakistan, Ecuador
and Uruguay). This diﬀerential treatment has not only taken the form of en-
tirely excluding some debts (in particular, multilateral oﬃcial debt) from debt
restructurings, but also of negotiating more favorable deals for subclasses of pri-
vate claims. Thus, for example, the “Brady deals” that settled the debt crises of
the 1980s restructured bank loans but not international bonds (Merrill Lynch,
1995).
More recently, the composition of sovereign debt has shifted away from syn-
dicated bank loans, which were the dominant form of lending in the 1970s and
1980s, towards bond ﬁnance (see Figure 1). While there is no single cause
that explains this change in composition, one reason, undoubtedly, has been
the perception, following the debt crises of the 1980s and the Brady deals, that
syndicated bank loans were too easy to restructure. In valuing the new bond
issues, at least some lenders have factored in a lower risk of restructuring of in-
ternational bonds. To the extent that these bond issues were widely dispersed,
they were perceived to be more diﬃcult to restructure, and therefore less likely
to be restructured in a debt crisis:
There are several things that make international bonds much
harder to restructure than loans. First, they typically involve many
more investors than do loans, even syndicated loans. Second, they
may be in bearer form so investors may be untraceable. (Euromoney6,
October 1999).
The recent debt crises and defaults of Russia and Argentina have highlighted
just how diﬃcult comprehensive debt restructuring negotiations can be, when
6Michael Peterson, "A crash course in default", Euromoney (October 1999), 47-50.
8they involve hundreds of thousand diﬀerent bondholders with a wide variety of
objectives.
During most of the 1990s the diﬀerential treatment of sovereign claims has
followed a pattern that is consistent with an implicit seniority of international
bonds over international bank loans. A total of 93 sovereigns have defaulted on
their syndicated bank loans since 1975, including 20 that had bonds outstanding
at the same time as their bank loans were in default. Yet, only 9 out of these
20 sovereigns also defaulted on their bonds, and the others serviced them in full
(Standard and Poor’s, 2003).
The restructuring of Russian sovereign debt (August 1998-August 2000) is
typical of this pattern. Domestic debt and Soviet era London and Paris Club
debts have been restructured (with international bank creditors accepting a debt
exchange involving a 40 percent reduction in the present value of their claims),
while Eurobonds have been left untouched. Market participants have viewed
this latest Russian debt restructuring episode as further corroboration of the
sovereigns’ tendency of treating creditors diﬀerently according to their power of
nuisance:
defaulters will always try to pick oﬀ the weakest creditors ﬁrst.
Russia has specialized in playing oﬀ one class of creditors against
another, ﬁrst by defaulting on its domestic debt while keeping up its
Eurobond payments and more recently by attempting to restructure
Soviet-era debt (Euromoney, October 1999, p. 48).
Market participants were also well aware that such behavior resulted in an
implicit seniority structure aﬀecting the pricing and valuation of debt:
It is that implicit seniority which, in part, explains why bonds
have become such favoured instruments for countries raising debt in
9recent years, says Ernesto Martinez Alas, and analyst at Moody’s.
(Euromoney, October 1999, p. 50)
The majority of governments treated bonds as being eﬀectively
senior to bank loans, and they did so with the tacit consent of bank
creditors. (Standard and Poor’s, 2003)
The implicit seniority structure created by the Brady deal has been under-
mined by the debt restructuring of Pakistan (1999-2001). For the ﬁrst time,
Pakistan was pressured to demand comparable concessions from bond holders
as from banks under the Paris Club deal, which itself was inspired by the new
policy shift towards greater private sector involvement,a d v o c a t e di nt h eR e y
Report (1996). Pakistan ended up restructuring bilateral oﬃcial debt, bank
claims and - for the ﬁrst time - Eurobonds, but not domestic debt. Although
the amount of Eurobonds involved was small (they accounted for less than 2
percent of Pakistan’s external debt), this debt restructuring signiﬁcantly altered
the market’s perception of the implicit seniority structure in international sov-
ereign debt. Indeed, the announcement, in January 1999, that Pakistan would
be forced to restructure its Eurobonds, triggered a rise in international bond
spreads issued by emerging market governments other than Pakistan in the
order of 25 to 95 basis points (Zettelmeyer, 2003).
Ever since the Pakistan restructuring and the oﬃcial sector’s perceived shift
in policy towards private sector involvement (especially for small countries),
market conﬁdence that bonds hold priority over bank loans has been shattered.
Two recent restructuring episodes, involving Ecuador in 2000, and Uruguay
in 2003, where bond issues have been restructured but bank loans have been
left untouched, have further eroded market beliefs. Perhaps in reaction to this
shift in policy, innovative clauses have been introduced in new bond issues, that
attempt to strengthen their de facto seniority. For example, one of the two Eu-
10robonds that creditors were oﬀered in Ecuador’s 2000 debt exchange contained
a “principal reinstatement” clause, which provided for an automatic upward
adjustment in principal in the event of a default. The face value of the bond
holder’s claim was to rise by a given amount in the event that Ecuador de-
faulted on the new bonds after the restructuring. Thus, incumbent bondholders
received (temporary) protection from dilution that might result from new debt
issuance.
This discussion points to several stylized facts that the theory in this paper
will attempt to capture and explain:
• sovereigns do not default in the same way on diﬀerent classes of debt
instruments and this selectivity generates an implicit seniority between debt
classes;
• seniority seems related to structural features of sovereign debt that make
it more or less easy to renegotiate with creditors;
• international investors are aware of this implicit seniority structure and
pay close attention to potential shifts in its determinants;
• the composition of international sovereign debt tends to shift to the class
o fi n s t r u m e n t st h a ti sp e r c e i v e da ss e n i o ra tag i v e np o i n ti nt i m e .
The remainder of this paper develops a model of sovereign debt, in a world
without IMF bailouts, where, we believe, the two major moral hazard prob-
lems are strategic defaults and debt dilution by sovereigns. We not only model
ex-post debt dilution, as has already been done by others, but we also charac-
terize for the ﬁrst time the optimal ex-ante debt structure, or de facto seniority
structure. We show in particular that, in an eﬀort to commit to limited debt
dilution, sovereigns make their ex-ante debt contracts excessively diﬃcult to re-
structure. We conclude from our analysis that a policy intervention that would
make seniority and priority in sovereign debt legally enforceable would at the
same time eliminate the distortion towards excessively hard debt and prevent
11overborrowing when sovereigns are approaching ﬁnancial distress.
3 The Model: assumptions
We consider a small open economy over three periods with a single homogenous
good that can be consumed or invested. The representative resident of this
economy may raise funds from the rest of the world by issuing (sovereign) debt
in the ﬁrst period (t =0 ). This debt is to be repaid in the next two periods
(t =1 ,2). The funds raised in the ﬁrst period can be used for consumption or
investment purposes.
To keep the analysis as tractable as possible we specify the following simple
form for the utility function of the representative resident:
U = V (g)+c1 + c2.
where,
1. c1 and c2 denote the consumption levels of the representative resident in
periods 1 and 2 respectively, and
2. V (g) represents the gross present value of funds g raised at time 0 by is-
suing debt. This value may be generated through additional consumption
at t =0or through public investment in infrastructure, health, schooling,
etc. We do not need to specify exactly how the money raised is spent. We
shall assume that V 0(g) > 0 and V 00(g) < 0.
The representative resident produces stochastic output y1 and y2 in respec-
tively periods 1 and 2. The probability distribution functions over output in
each period are given by f1(.) and f2(.). It is convenient, but not essential,
to think of the respective outputs in periods 1 and 2 as independently distrib-
uted. We also make the inessential simplifying assumption that the realization
12of output in both periods, y1 and y2,i sk n o w ni np e r i o d17. We normalize the
country’s output in period t =0to y0 =0 .T h es o v e r e i g na c t so nb e h a l fo ft h e
representative resident and maximizes her welfare8.





By borrowing from the rest of the world she may be able to enhance her
welfare. We shall take it that the sovereign debt market is perfectly competitive
and that the equilibrium riskless interest rate is equal to zero. But that is
not to say that the sovereign debt market is perfectly eﬃcient. Indeed, as we
already hinted at, two forms of moral hazard limit the eﬃciency of the sovereign
debt market in our model: the classical willingness-to-pay problem in sovereign
lending (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981) and, debt dilution where the sovereign
reduces the value of outstanding debt by taking out new risky debt.
If sovereign debt markets were perfectly eﬃcient and the sovereign were able
to perfectly commit to repaying its debts up to its ability to repay, and also
to commit not to take out new debt in periods 1 and 2, then it would raise an
optimal amount of funds, g∗,i np e r i o d0 given by the ﬁrst-order condition for
eﬃcient borrowing:
V 0(g∗)=1 .
The sovereign would raise funds up to the point where the marginal beneﬁto fa n
extra unit of funds is equal to the marginal cost of borrowing (which is always 1
7This is a common simplifying assumption made in the corporate ﬁnance literature (see, for
example, Hart and Moore, 1998). If the realization of y2 were not perfectly known in period
1, the only diﬀerence in our analysis would be a slightly more involved decision problem for
the sovereign in period 1. Generalizing our model to allow for this uncertainty would result
in a more complex analysis without yielding any additional insights.
8In Bolton and Jeanne (2002) we model the issuing country government as a self-interested
agent and begin to explore the implications for sovereign lending of the presence of this agency
problem. See also Chang (2002) for a related analysis.
13given our assumption that world interest rates are equal to zero). This level of
borrowing is our eﬃciency benchmark. If the sovereign ends up borrowing more
than g∗ we shall say that there is over-borrowing and if it ends up borrowing
less we shall say that there is under-borrowing.
The Modigliani-Miller theorem tells us that the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient repay-
ment stream is indeterminate and that any agreed repayment stream, with an
expected value of g∗ would be equivalent. To focus our analysis squarely on the
design of debt renegotiability, we shall allow the issuer to only issue long-term
debt maturing in period 2. In a follow-up paper we also explore the optimal
debt-maturity structure by allowing the sovereign to issue any combination of
short-term debt (maturing in period 1) and long-term debt. Here, we shall con-
sider two forms of debt that the sovereign can issue: renegotiable debt (or r-debt)
and non-renegotiable debt (or n-debt). Renegotiable debt and non-renegotiable
debt can be interpreted as respectively syndicated bank loans and bonds (Gert-
ner and Scharfstein, 1991; Lipworth and Nystedt, 2001), or as bonds with exit
consents and collective action clauses versus bonds without such clauses9.W e
shall allow the sovereign to issue any combination of r-debt and n-debt.
The sovereign may issue debt in period 0 to ﬁnance the expenditure g,a n d
again in period 1 to ﬁnance consumption c1. We respectively denote by Dr
02
and Dn
02 the amount of r-debt and n-debt that the sovereign promises to repay
in period 2 when it issues debt in period 0. Similarly, we denote by Dr
12 and
Dn
12 the promised repayments on new debt issued in period 1.I np e r i o d2 the






9See Eichengreen (2003) for a discussion of the role of Collective Action Clauses in sov-
ereign debt restructuring, and Buchheit and Gulati (2000) for a discussion of exit consents in










The promise to repay D2 is credible only if it is in the sovereign’s interest
to repay ex post. We follow the sovereign debt literature by assuming that the
sovereign repays its debts only as a way of avoiding a costly default. Like Sachs
and Cohen (1982) and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996), we model the cost of default
as a proportional output loss, γy2.10
Critically for our analysis we decompose this cost into two components:
γy2 = ρy2 + λy2.
The ﬁrst component is a deadweight cost that the country must bear whenever
it fails to repay its debt in full (it can be interpreted as a reputational cost of
default, or a collateral output loss resulting from capital ﬂight or a banking crisis,
for example). The second component is a sanction that creditors may impose
or waive (the output loss resulting from litigation by creditors in foreign courts
10It is generally assumed in the literature that the cost of defaulting is the same whether
the sovereign defaults in full or whether it repays part of its debt. This is a somewhat
extreme assumption, but it is a more plausible assumption than another extreme assumption
that comes to mind, by which default costs are only proportional to the size of the default.
Concretely, this alternative assumption would specify default costs of min{γs,y2 − R}f o ra
shortfall in repayments s =( D2−R). It is easy to see that under this assumption the sovereign
always defaults in full when γ<1.A n dw h e nγ ≥ 1 then the sovereign only defaults if it is
unable to repay all its debts (y2 <D 2). And then it always repays all it can. This assumption
clearly gives rise to unrealistic and implausible sovereign default behavior.
Reality is likely to lie somewhere in between these extreme assumptions and one might
want to consider the more general default cost function γ(s)y2,w h e r eγ(s) is increasing in
the repayment shortfall s from zero to a maximum value, γ<1.I fγ(·) is a concave function
then, when the sovereign is better oﬀ defaulting, it is optimal to always default in full and
incur the cost γy2. Our analysis would be virtually unchanged if we allowed for this more
general default cost function.
On the other hand, if γ(·) is a convex function then there may be an interval of output
realizations y2 for which it is optimal for the sovereign to repay some of its debt obligations
when it defaults. Allowing for this possibility, while adding more realism to the model would
not alter the main thrust of our analysis. It would however require a more involved analysis
in places.
15or from trade sanctions, for example). The various default costs considered in
the literature on sovereign debt fall in one or the other category (see Eaton
and Gersowitz, 1981, for the ﬁrst type, and Bulow and Rogoﬀ, 1989, for the
second type). The ﬁrst component is a clear deadweight cost of default. It is an
output loss incurred by the contracting parties following a default. The second
component, on the other hand, is a cost that can be avoided if the creditors can
be persuaded to waive sanctions in debt renegotiations following default.
Whether creditors can be persuaded to lift the sanctions depends on whether
debt is of the renegotiable or nonrenegotiable type. We assume that the holders
of renegotiable debt (the r-creditors for short) can be coordinated at no cost11
around a debt restructuring agreement in which they consent to lift the sanction
λy2 in exchange of a payment η. In contrast, such an agreement is impossible
to reach with the holders of n-debt (the n-creditors), since they are widely
dispersed and the debt contract does not include any mechanism allowing them
to collectively agree to a debt restructuring plan. The n-creditors automatically
impose the sanction if they are not fully repaid. This ineﬃciency captures the
idea that when debt holders are widely dispersed it will be diﬃcult to reach an
acceptable agreement to everyone in a timely fashion and to avoid free riding
by hold-out creditors12.
More formally, the sequence of actions in period 2 is as depicted in Figure
2. First, the government decides whether to repay its debts fully or default.
Following a default, the r-creditors make a take-or-leave repayment demand
of η ≤ Dr
2. The government then accepts or rejects the r-creditors’ demand.
11An alternative interpretation of our assumptions is that if there is a deadweight cost of
renegotiating r-debt, this cost is already subsumed in the “reputation cost” ρy2.
12This ineﬃciency may be incurred even though it hurts n-creditors collectively because
of a free-rider problem–like in Diamond and Rajan (2001) or Jeanne (2004). For example,
individual litigating creditors could hope to seize some collateral. If they litigate in an unco-
ordinated way, these creditors might impose an output cost on the country that is much larger
than the value of collateral that they can seize. Similarly, the n-creditors may be unable to
accept a voluntary decentralized debt exchange or repurchase, even an eﬃcient one, because
of free-riding by holdouts (Bulow and Rogoﬀ, 1991).
16Acceptance implies a partial default on r-debt, in which the r-creditors receive
af r a c t i o nη/Dr
2 of their claims and the n-creditors are fully repaid. Rejection
implies a full default in which the government repays nothing to its r-and n-
creditors and incurs the sanction λy2.I ft h eo ﬀer is rejected r-creditors impose
sanctions on the sovereign, in which case the sovereign might as well default on
n-debt, as there is no further cost in defaulting on all debts. Figure 2 gives the
payoﬀs of the government and its creditors under full repayment, and partial
and full default.
The diﬀerence between the two types of creditors relates to their ability to
act collectively, not in the size of the sanction they can impose on the debtor
or in their bargaining power. The n-creditors, as a group, cannot negotiate
a debt reduction with the sovereign. By contrast, the r-creditors can bargain
collectively. They have all the bargaining power, since they make a take-or-leave
oﬀe r . T h e yw i l la s kf o raf u l lr e p a y m e n t ,η = Dr
2, whenever possible, and for
a lower repayment only to preempt a costly sovereign default that reduces the
total repayment (to zero in our model).
This formulation captures in a simple way the fact that some types of sov-
ereign debt are more diﬃcult to restructure than others because of coordination
problems between creditors, and that these types of debt tend to get restruc-
tured less often. Here, we simplify the situation in the extreme by assuming
that n-debt is impossible to restructure. This assumption trivially implies that
debt restructuring, if it occurs, involves r-debt only. This is a simple represen-
tation of the selective defaults which, as documented in the previous section,
are one way that sovereigns discriminate between diﬀerent classes of creditors
in the real world.
Admittedly, our model leaves aside important complications that arise in
real world sovereign defaults. It would be more realistic to let the sovereign ne-
gotiate simultaneously with both types of creditors. However, the modeling of
17debt restructuring negotiations involving both r-debt and n-debt is not obvious
a priori. Especially, ﬁnding a way of capturing the idea that n-debt is more
diﬃcult to renegotiate in a model of trilateral bargaining is far from straightfor-
ward13. Here, we abstract from these complications by assuming that the only
way that the sovereign discriminates between its creditors is through selective
defaults. We believe that this is an acceptable simpliﬁcation, given that the
focus of our analysis is on understanding the implications of unequal creditor
treatment for the ex ante equilibrium of the debt market, rather than on ac-
counting for all the diﬀerent ways in which creditors can be treated unequally
ex post.
To summarize, the timing of moves and events in our model is as follows:
The sovereign begins by raising g in period 0 in the form of debt repayable in
period 2.I np e r i o d1 the sovereign can issue more debt also repayable the next
period. We assume that these borrowing decisions are made sequentially and
that the sovereign cannot commit to its future debt management in period 0.
This assumption seems reasonable as a benchmark, since in the real world there
is no obvious way a sovereign can commit not to issue debt in the future. In
period 2 output y2 is realized and debts are repaid. In case of a default the
debt restructuring continuation game described above is triggered. Finally, the
representative resident consumes the remaining output and the game ends.
In the following sections our ultimate goal is to characterize the optimal
debt structure chosen by the sovereign in period 0. We proceed in several steps.
Section 4 begins with the characterization of equilibrium repayment behavior
in period 2. Section 5 shows that if commitment were possible, the government
would issue r-debt only in period 0. Section 6 shows that such a strategy is
not time consistent as the government is then tempted to dilute the r-debt in
13Intuitively, coordination problems are likely to enhance the leverage of n-creditors in the
debt restructuring process, thus reproducing in full defaults the kind of eﬀective priority that
we obtain here through the selectivity of defaults.
18period 1. Section 7 derives the equilibrium (time consistent) strategy, which
under fairly general conditions is to issue n-debt in period 0.
4S t r a t e g i c D e f a u l t
In this section we determine when the sovereign repays its debts in period 2 and
when it defaults, taking Dr
2 and Dn
2 as given. The debtor country may repay
all its debts, default partially, or fully. Default results in an unavoidable output
loss of ρy2. If the government defaults on its n-debt an additional output loss
of λy2 is incurred.
Let us assume that the sovereign defaults. Is the default full or partial? This
depends on whether the r-creditors can make an acceptable oﬀer η ≥ 0 to the
sovereign. In the event of a partial default on r-debt, the sovereign’s payoﬀ is
(1 − ρ)y2 − η − Dn
2
if it accepts the oﬀer η from r-creditors. Should the oﬀer η be rejected, there
is a full default and the sovereign’s payoﬀ is (1 − ρ − λ)y2. The r-creditors can
make an acceptable oﬀer, therefore, if and only if,
Dn
2 ≤ λy2. (1)
The holders of r-debt always prefer a positive repayment η ≥ 0 to a full default
with no repayment. Since they have all the bargaining power, they therefore
set η at the level that makes the sovereign indiﬀerent between a partial and a
full default, or
η = λy2 − Dn
2.
By contrast, if Dn
2 >λ y 2 the r-creditors cannot make an acceptable oﬀer and
the default must be full. The sovereign is better oﬀ defaulting on all its debts
than selectively defaulting on r-debt. Conditional on a default, therefore, the
default is partial if y2 is larger than Dn
2/λ, and full otherwise.
19When is the sovereign better oﬀ defaulting? To answer this question we only




and its payoﬀ under partial or full default, which in either case is
(1 − ρ − λ)y2,
since all renegotiation rents are extracted by r-creditors. Thus, the sovereign







A partial default, therefore, occurs if and only if conditions (1) and (2) are
















Ordering these cases in terms of y2 then gives the following result:
Proposition 1 The sovereign’s debt repayment strategy is as follows:






γ . The sovereign fully repays its renego-
tiable and non-renegotiable debt.
(ii) partial default: if
Dn
2




γ . The sovereign fully repays its
non-renegotiable debt and repays λy2 − Dn
2 to the holders of renegotiable debt.
(ii) full default: if y2 <
Dn
2
λ . The sovereign defaults on all outstanding debts
and repays nothing.
Proof. See discussion above.
Notice that the parties’ period−2 payoﬀs have been speciﬁed under the as-
sumption that the sovereign consumes the entire period−1 output y1 in period
1. It turns out that there is no loss of generality in our model in assuming
20that the sovereign consumes net output as it accrues. The reason is that the
sovereign is assumed to be risk neutral. Moreover, if the sovereign decided to
save part or all of y1 until period 2 there would be no change in the sovereign’
s debt repayment decision. Indeed, the sovereign’s decision to repay the debt is
entirely driven by the cost of default, which is proportional to period−2 output,
and is therefore not aﬀected by any savings decision in period 114.
This proposition clariﬁes the notion that non-renegotiable debt is eﬀectively
senior to renegotiable debt. In the case of partial default, the allocation of the
repayment between r-creditors and n-creditors is the same as if the latter enjoyed
strict seniority over the former. Because of this eﬀective seniority, n-creditors
have a larger expected recovery ratio than r-creditors, so that the interest rate
spread should be lower on n-debt than on r-debt.
5 Optimal debt structure under commitment
What is the ex-ante optimal combination of n-debt and r-debt? The answer
to this question depends on whether the government can commit not to dilute
debt issued in period 0 with new debt issued in period 1. I nt h i ss e c t i o nw e
assume that the government can credibly commit not to dilute its initial debt.
We thereby isolate the only remaining moral hazard problem in our model: the
classic willingness-to-pay problem. This assumption, although not realistic, pro-
vides a convenient benchmark for the case with no commitment, where dilution
is possible.
It is not diﬃcult to see that in equilibrium, the sovereign would want to
commit not to issue new debt in period 1. Indeed, for any funds g1 ≥ 0 raised
in period 1 by issuing new debt, the country’s ex ante welfare, taking the lenders’
14This is an important simplifying feature of our model, which is speciﬁct ot h es o v e r e i g n
debt problem. In a corporate debt problem, in contrast, any accumulated cash-ﬂow can be
seized by creditors upon default. Therefore, the decision on how much cash-ﬂow to accumulate
in earlier periods has an important bearing on the corporate borrower’s future default decision.
21participation constraint to be binding, is given by
U0 = V (g) − g + E0(y1 + y2) − E0(  | g + g1), (4)
where   is the deadweight cost of default. Note that the funds raised in period
1 only appear in the term E0(  | g + g1),a sa n yb e n e ﬁt derived by consuming
g1 in period-1 entails expected repayments to creditors in period 2 that exactly
oﬀset g1 in period 2.T h u s , t h e o n l y e ﬀect of issuing debt in period 1 is to
reduce ex ante welfare by raising the likelihood of default and deadweight costs
E0(  | g + g1).
We are now in a position to establish that when there is no debt dilution it
is optimal for the sovereign to only issue r-debt.
Proposition 2 Let [y,y] denote the support of f2(·). Under a pure willingness-
to-repay problem the sovereign’s debt structure is such that a full default never
occurs in equilibrium: Dn
2 <λ y .I f g∗ >γ ythe sovereign under-borrows in
period 0.
Proof. See appendix.
This proposition deﬁnes the sense in which the renegotiable and nonrenego-
tiable debts can be viewed as respectively “good” and “bad” in our model. If the
government could commit not to dilute, it would always keep n-debt at a level
where full default is impossible. The equilibrium debt structure is not uniquely
deﬁned in general, but one debt structure that is always optimal is pure r-debt.
This striking result is driven by our assumptions that n-debt involves a higher
deadweight cost of default of λy2 and that r-creditors are able to appropriate
the entire amount λy2 in debt renegotiations following default. In the other
extreme case where the bargaining power in debt renegotiations is entirely in
the hands of the sovereign it may be strictly optimal for the sovereign to issue
22a strictly positive amount of n-debt as a way of commiting to making higher
debt repayments15. In general, for intermediate bargaining powers it may be
optimal to issue an amount of n-debt that just balances the ex-ante commitment
beneﬁts and the ex-post deadweight costs of default.
We focus on the extreme case where r-creditors have all the bargaining power
in renegotiation for expositional reasons. In this case there is a clear prediction
on the optimal form of debt in a pure willingness-to-pay problem. As we shall
see in the following sections, however, in the presence of both a willingness-to-
pay and a dilution problem it is generally optimal for the sovereign to issue a
strictly positive amount of n-debt as a way of mitigating dilution.
6 Dilution with renegotiable debt
We now relax the assumption on commitment made in the previous section and
characterize the sovereign’ s optimal dynamic borrowing policy, when it is re-
stricted to issuing r-debt only. We begin by observing that the commitment not
to dilute is time-inconsistent, and we show that the time-consistent borrowing
strategy involves both excessive defaults and a lower level of expenditure g than
15To see this, compare r-debt and n-debt required to raise the same amount g in the following
example, where the sovereign has all the bargaining power and y2 is uniformly distributed in
[0,y]. Under r-debt the sovereign now defaults whenever y2 ≤ Dr
ρ , while under n-debt it only
defaults when y2 ≤ Dn
γ . Given that creditors receive nothing in a default, the sovereign must
set Dr and Dn such that
g = Dr(1 − Dr/ρy)=Dn(1 − Dn/γy). (5)
























w h i c hi st r u eb e c a u s eo f( 5 )a n dDr >D n.
Unfortunately, the general case where the sovereign’s bargaining power is arbitrary and
f2(·) is a general distribution is not straightforward to characterize. This is why we work with
the simple benchmark where the sovereign has no bargaining power, when it is easy to see
that r-debt is optimal.
23under commitment.
Suppose that the sovereign issues r-debt Dr
02 in period 0 and consider the
sovereign’s incentive to issue new r-debt in period 1. The new debt is a promise
to repay Dr
12 (on top of Dr
02)i np e r i o d2. If the realization of output y2 observed
by the sovereign in period 1 is such that Dr
02 <γ y 2 the country is solvent
absent any new debt issue. By issuing a new debt claim Dr
12 the representative
resident’s payoﬀ is then:
U1 = y1 + Dr
















+( 1− γ)y2 if Dr
02 + Dr
12 >γ y 2.
(Note that the payoﬀ from the public expenditure g is sunk in period 1 and
can be ommitted.)
The ﬁrst expression corresponds to the case where the amount of new debt
Dr
12 is small enough to keep the country solvent. The country will then repay
Dr
12 with certainty, so that it is able to raise an amount g1 = Dr
12 from the
competitive capital markets. Since the country entirely repays Dr
12 in period 2,
such additional borrowing in period 1 is a wash and does not aﬀect welfare in
any way. We assume then that when indiﬀerent the country chooses to issue no
new debt.
The second expression corresponds to the case where the amount of new
debt is large enough to force the country into default in period 2. The default is
always followed by a renegotiation since there is no n-debt. Then the proceeds
of the new loan are equal to the total repayment conditional on a default,




12). In practice, sovereign debt restructuring often takes the form of a pro-rata
“haircut” across multiple debt issues, as we are assuming here. It is precisely the
lack of clear seniority in debt renegotiations of existing debt over newly issued
24debt that is the source of debt-dilution moral-hazard in sovereign lending16.
Because of this pro-rata haircut, the sovereign’s payoﬀ at t =1is now
strictly increasing with Dr
12. Each additional dollar of debt costs nothing to
the representative resident (who loses γy2 in a default anyway), and can be
sold at a positive price to the new lenders. Each additional dollar of new debt
issued, then comes entirely at the expense of the long-term creditors who see
their claims diluted.
Conditional on a default, the country’s welfare is then bounded above by
y1 + λy2 + y2(1 − γ)=y1 + y2(1 − ρ).
We shall assume for simplicity that this payoﬀ c a na l w a y sb ea t t a i n e db yi s s u i n g
as u ﬃciently large new debt Dr
12 in period 1.
In equilibrium, the country does not dilute its initial debt Dr
02 if and only if
the resulting welfare, (y1 + y2 − Dr
2) is higher than the welfare under dilution,
y1 + y2(1 − ρ).T h i s d e ﬁnes an upper bound for initial debt above which the
sovereign will have an incentive to dilute the initial debt:
Dr
02 ≤ ρy2. (6)
Note that while condition (6) was derived under the assumption that the country
was solvent (Dr
02 ≤ γy2), an insolvent sovereign, knowing that the default cost
will have to be paid anyway, systematically dilutes its long-term creditors. So
condition (6) is both necessary and suﬃcient for dilution not to occur. We sum-
marize our discussion of the incentives towards debt dilution in the proposition
below.
Proposition 3 The sovereign dilutes its r-debt in period 1 and defaults in pe-
16In the case of corporate debt, debt dilution moral hazard can be eliminated by making
older debt senior to new debt. Subordination clauses or security agreements in debt contracts
are enforceable in courts and are routinely included in corporate debt contracts (see Smith
and Warner, 1979, for a description of the more common seniority protections in corporate
debt). This is, however, not the case for sovereign debt.






Proof. See discussion above.
Increasing period 1 consumption through more borrowing in period 1 always
comes at the cost of a reduced period 2 consumption. But, when output y2 is
relatively low then the gains from repaying Dr
02 and not defaulting are small.
At that point it becomes tempting to borrow more and dilute the existing debt.
More generally, the sovereign has a tendency to overborrow and dilute when it
approaches ﬁnancial distress17.
In equilibrium, debt dilution is, of course, anticipated and initial lenders will
demand a higher repayment to compensate for such dilution. This will result
in an even higher overall cost of borrowing, and therefore, in lower borrowing
in period 0. The equilibrium level of debt Dr
02 that is required in period 0 to
ﬁnance a level g of public expenditure under no commitment is easily derived.
As the long-term creditors are repaid Dr
02 only if there is no dilution and get







Suppose that g is small enough that a solution Dr
02(g) satisfying this equation
exists. The country’s ex-ante welfare is then given by:





The last term on the right-hand-side of (9) is the agency cost of debt. It is
strictly positive if y2 falls below Dr
02(g)/ρ with a strictly positive probability.
17If y2 were uncertain in period 1, the government would dilute when the probability of a
default in period 2 conditional on no dilution exceeds a certain threshold.
26Welfare is lower under no commitment than under commitment, for any








2(g) is the equilibrium debt repayment under commitment (this expres-
sion can be derived by taking the diﬀerence of (9) and (14)). This expression is
positive for two reasons. First, if the risk premium on r-debt were the same un-
der no commitment as under commitment (i.e., if Dr
02(g) were equal to Dr
2(g)),
welfare would be lower under no commitment because dilution results in more
frequent defaults. Second, the risk premium is, of course, higher under no com-
mitment: Dr
02(g) >D r
2(g) (compare (8) and (15)). The risk premium is larger
under no commitment because lenders have to be compensated for the risk of
dilution.
T h eo n l yc a s ei nw h i c ht h eﬁrst-best is not distorted is if ρy2 is larger than
g∗ with probability 1. Then the government can borrow Dr
02 = g∗ and repays
with certainty. Otherwise the agency cost of debt is strictly positive, leading the
government to reduce g below the ﬁrst-best level. We summarize this discussion
in the proposition below.
Proposition 4 If g∗ >ρ y , the level of period 0 borrowing and welfare under
no commitment are strictly below the levels of borrowing and welfare under a
commitment not to dilute debt.
Proof. See discussion above.
7 Non-renegotiable debt to forestall dilution





when the government can issue both r-debt and n-debt in periods 0 and 1,a n d
cannot commit not to dilute early lenders.
27The analysis proceeds along the following steps. First, we highlight the
comparative advantage of n-debt, which is that it cannot be diluted. The holders
of long-term n-debt are protected against dilution by their eﬀective seniority.
The sovereign, therefore, may make some of its long-term debt nonrenegotiable
as a way of forestalling dilution.
The sovereign makes its long-term debt nonrenegotiable as long as the beneﬁt
of forestalling dilution dominates the cost of higher deadweight losses of default
in period 2. The optimal debt structure depends on the speciﬁcation and the
parameters of the model. We show in section 7.2 that under a fairly general
condition on the stochastic distribution of second period output y2,i ti so p t i m a l
for the government to make its debt entirely nonrenegotiable.
7.1 Dilution
Expropriation of outstanding debt through dilution requires both a default and
a debt restructuring. Intuitively, thus, a debt issue that is more diﬃcult to
restructure should also be more diﬃcult to dilute. Such an issue is not only less
vulnerable to a selective default but it may also get preferential treatment in a
restructuring.
This intuition is captured in a stark way by our model, as n-debt cannot
be diluted at all. An implication of Proposition 1 is that it is impossible to
expropriate n-creditors who have lent in period 0 with a new round of lending
in period 1. The reason is simply that when period 0 n-creditors are not fully
repaid, no other creditors are18. In contrast, renegotiable debt can be diluted
by subsequent issues of either renegotiable or non-renegotiable debt.
Consider ﬁrst dilution through new renegotiable debt issues. Dilution is
18This extreme outcome is driven by our assumption that the recovery value of debt is zero
in a full default. If the recovery value of n-debt were positive, the n-debt issued in period 0
could be diluted in period 1 (by issuing more n-debt if n-creditors were eﬀectively senior to
r-creditors in the restructuring process). Even in this case, however, it would remain true that
n-debt is diluted less often than r-debt.
28possible in period 1 only if Dn
02 <λ y 2 (if not, investors will not provide any
new loans since they know that there will be a full default in period 2). If the
government issues new r-debt Dr
12 the representative resident’s payoﬀ is given
by
U1 = y1 + Dr














02)+( 1− γ)y2 if Dr
02 + Dr
12 + Dn
02 >γ y 2.
Given that Dn
02 ≤ λy2, the old n-debt will be fully repaid with certainty, and the
only debt that can be diluted is the r-debt. The maximum beneﬁt of dilution
is achieved by completely diluting the old r-debt, which yields a payoﬀ U1 =
y1 +( λy2 − Dn
02)+( 1− γ)y2 = y1 +( 1− ρ)y2 − Dn
02. This is higher than the






This condition is the same as (7), the condition for dilution when there is no
n-debt.
Note that complete dilution of old r-debt could also be achieved by issuing an
amount λy2−Dn
02 of n-debt. The payoﬀs to creditors are the same in both cases:
n-creditors receive all the pledgeable output and r-creditors receive nothing.
Thus, r-debt and n-debt are perfectly substitutable in diluting r-debt. To sum
u p ,w eh a v es h o w n :
Proposition 5 If the country has issued non-renegotiable debt Dn
02 and rene-
gotiable debt Dr









Proof. See discussion above.
When can the government ﬁnance the ﬁrst-best level of expenditure g∗ with
an eﬃcient, default-free debt structure? If g∗ <γ y , the government can im-
plement the ﬁrst-best outcome by issuing only n-debt Dn
02 = g∗ and never
29defaulting on it. Alternatively, the government could issue a mixture of n-debt
and r-debt, provided that the level of r-debt stays low enough to prevent dilu-
tion. As mentioned in section 6, a pure r-debt structure can also implement the
ﬁrst-best if g∗ <ρ y .
A contrario if,
g∗ >γ y , (11)
the ﬁrst-best level of expenditure g∗ cannot be ﬁnanced with a default-free debt
structure. We assume that (11) is satisﬁed in the remainder of the analysis, so
that debt dilution is a problem in equilibrium.
7.2 When non-renegotiable debt dominates
For any given level of expenditure g, the government chooses the debt structure
to minimize the agency cost of debt. This choice involves a tradeoﬀ between
n-debt, which reduces the rate of dilution and the frequency of defaults, and
r-debt, which entails a lower deadweight cost of default.
What is the optimal second-best debt structure? It is easy to see from
the tradeoﬀ described above that the answer to this question is not obvious in
general. However, it is possible to show that generally the government issues a
strictly positive amount of n-debt in equilibrium.
Proposition 6 If yf2(y)=0 , the sovereign issues n-debt in period 0 up to a
level where the probability of a full default is strictly positive.
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition behind this result is the following. Assume that n-debt is
set in period 0 at the maximum level consistent with a zero probability of a
full default. Then by issuing a small (ﬁrst-order) additional amount of n-debt
that will almost surely be fully repaid, the country can ﬁnance a ﬁrst-order
increase in g.I fyf2(y)=0 , the associated increase in the expected deadweight
30cost of a full default is of the second-order. The country, therefore, will issue
more n-debt in period 0, up to a level where the probability of a full default
is strictly positive. This is the weak form of what one might refer to as the
Gresham law for sovereign debt: “bad” (non-renegotiable) debt always drives
some “good” (renegotiable) debt out when there is a risk of dilution and the
marginal deadweight cost of n-debt is not too large.
The optimal share of n-debt is diﬃc u l tt op i nd o w ni ng e n e r a l ,b u tc a nb e
explicitly determined under the following assumption.
Assumption A1. h(x) ≡
R +∞
x f2(y)dy/(xf2(x)) is strictly decreasing with
x in the domain of f2(·).
This assumption holds for a number of well known distributions, including
the normal, the exponential and the uniform distributions. If the distribution
of output satisﬁes this assumption then we obtain the following result.
Proposition 7 U n d e rA s s u m p t i o nA 1 ,as e c o n d - b e s td e b ts t r u c t u r ei so p t i m a l









The optimal debt structure is not uniquely determined. One optimal debt struc-
ture is pure n-debt ( Dr






This is what one might refer to as the strong form of our Gresham law:
under assumption A1, not only is n-debt present in equilibrium, but it com-
pletely crowds out r-debt. Assumption A1 is relatively weak but it is necessary
for n-debt to unambiguously crowd out r-debt. In the appendix we provide a
counterexample where the distribution of y2 does not satisfy A1 (it is binomial)
and it may be optimal for the government to issue some r-debt in equilibrium.
31The intuition behind assumption A1 is the following. When dilution occurs
in equilibrium, substituting r-debt by n-debt for a given level of g has two
opposite eﬀects on the agency cost of debt. On the one hand, the increase in
the level of n-debt raises the probability of a full default and so the expected
deadweight loss of default. On the other hand, reducing the level of r-debt
lowers the incidence of dilution. Assumption A1 ensures that the second eﬀect
dominates because the probability that y2 is just below the dilution threshold
Dr
2/ρ is not too low relative to the probability that y2 is just above the threshold
for full default, Dn
2/λ. Thus, it is always optimal for the sovereign to substitute
r-debt by n-debt up to the point where dilution does not occur in equilibrium.
The beneﬁts of nonrenegotiable debt are illustrated in Figure 4a-c for a nu-
merical speciﬁcation of the model that satisﬁes assumption A1: V (g)=
√
g,
ρ =1 /3,λ=2 /3, y1 =0and y2 uniformly distributed in the interval [0,1].
Figure 4a shows the equilibrium debt repayment D2 on the y-axis as a function
of the level of expenditure g on the x-axis, under respective scenarios of full
commitment, no commitment with r-debt, and with n-debt (the scenarios con-
sidered in sections 5, 6 and 7 respectively). Figure 4b displays the interest rate
(D2 −g)/g.A sﬁgure 4b shows, under no commitment the interest rate is lower
on n-debt. As is easy to see by now, the reason is that the dilution premium
on r-debt exceeds the higher risk premium on n-debt due to the lower recovery
value on n-debt. Figure 4c shows how ex ante welfare varies with g. Under no
commitment, issuing n-debt puts the economy close to the commitment equi-
librium: switching from r-debt to n-debt oﬀsets 60 percent of the decrease in g
and 70 percent of the welfare loss due to dilution.
328 Public Policy
Our analysis has shown that sovereigns have an incentive to bias their debt
structure towards debt that is harder to restructure as a way of achieving de
facto seniority and thus limit the extent of debt dilution. A sovereign engages
in this form of ineﬃcient debt structuring because there is no easy way of imple-
menting seniority de jure. In contrast to corporate debt, where courts generally
enforce priority and seniority, there is no easy way of legally enforcing priority
for sovereign debt.
If sovereign debt is ineﬃciently structured to make debt restructuring harder,
is there a case for policy intervention, and if so, how should policy be designed to
alleviate the severity of debt crises? We take up these questions in this section.
In response to the rapid growth of sovereign bond issues in the 1990s, and
following the proclaimed change in the I.M.F.’s policy towards reduced bailouts
and more debt restructuring in debt crises, there has been a growing call for
policy intervention to facilitate debt restructuring. There is, however, still an
ongoing heated debate on how deep this policy intervention should be. Many
in the international community favor a more interventionist policy and have
advocated that sovereign debt restructuring be modeled on existing practice in
corporate bankruptcy. Others, including most institutional investors and some
emerging market countries, favor a more limited intervention that would only
involve smoothing the implementation of debt-exchanges and introducing ma-
jority voting clauses–the so-called “collective action clauses” (CAC)–to help
restructure the payment terms of sovereign bonds. A consensus has emerged
from this debate that at least a limited form of intervention, mainly in the form
of CACs, would be desirable. The I.M.F.’s more interventionist sovereign debt
restructuring mechanism (SDRM) has been shelved for now by the G-10, but it
remains an option. Our analysis in this paper provides some simple answers to
33these complex policy questions. We begin our discussion with the more limited
form of intervention, the so-called contractual approach.
8.1 The contractual approach
Under the contractual approach, sovereigns are encouraged to facilitate debt
restructuring by including collective action clauses (CAC) in all their bond is-
sues. These clauses allow for the reduction in the payment terms of a bond
issue if a super-majority of bondholders (e.g., a 2/3 majority) approves a pro-
posed haircut. If a debtor wants to renegotiate the payment terms of a bond
issue with collective action clauses, it can approach the trustee representing the
bondholders with a renegotiation oﬀer, who in turn can put the proposal to a
vote of all bondholders. Currently CACs are mainly found in sovereign bonds
issued in London under English law19. Supporters of a contractual approach to
sovereign debt restructuring favor extending such clauses to all sovereign bond
issues.
This approach has been endorsed by academics and in some oﬃcial reports
(Eichengreen, 1999; Kenen, 2001; G-10, 1996; G-22, 1998). As is often the case
in policy debates, there are signiﬁcant policy diﬀerences on how intrusive public
policy should be in promoting the use of CACs even among the proponents of
the contractual approach. Thus, while current G-7 policy is to prod and nudge
issuers to adopt CACs the oﬃcial community insists on a purely voluntary
adoption of CACs. In contrast, several academic commentators have urged that
the adoption of CACs be subsidized, and possibly even mandated (Eichengreen,
19See Eichengreen (2003) for a discussion of collective action clauses. Most sovereign bonds
are governed by either English or New York law. While English law allows for a supermajority
of bondholders to amend the bond’s ﬁnancial terms, under New York law it was assumed that
unanimous consent of all bondholders was required to change the bond’s payment terms. The
trust indenture act of 1939 does indeed require unanimous consent for the restructuring of
corporate bonds issued in the US. Although this requirement does not apply to sovereign
bonds issued in the US, a unanimity rule has always been the norm for sovereign bonds issued
in New York.
341999; Kenen, 2001)20.
Returning to our model, if we interpret r-debt and n-debt as bonds respec-
tively with and without collective action clauses, it is clear that the voluntary,
market-led approach will not succeed in making debt structures more eﬃcient
ex ante. Propositions 6 and 7 reveal that sovereigns would issue an excessive
amount of bonds without collective action clauses even if they are fully aware
of their ex-post beneﬁts. This is our Gresham Law for sovereign debt: bad debt
crowds out good debt in equilibrium.
However, the ex-post ineﬃciency of equilibrium sovereign debt structures
does not mean that a more intrusive approach based on taxes and subsidies will
be ex-ante eﬃcient in our model. Suppose that n-debt is taxed at rate τ and
r-debt is subsidized at rate σ, so that a country that issues a quantity Dn
02 of
n-debt must pay a tax τDn
02 and receives a subsidy σDr
02 on r-debt. Suppose
furthermore that the tax and the subsidy balance each other at the country level
(τDn
02 = σDr
02), implying that the system involves no cross-country transfer,
and its welfare impact comes purely from the eﬀect of the tax and the subsidy
on equilibrium debt structures. We then obtain the following result.
Proposition 8 Taxing n-debt and subsidizing r-debt induces a substitution of
the former by the latter, but reduces the borrowing country’s welfare.
Proof. See appendix.
As one might expect based on our previous analysis, when the tax rate τ
increases, sovereigns substitute r-debt for n-debt, but this only aggravates the
dilution problem and leads to more frequent defaults. In the limit where τ =1
(r-debt is basically mandatory) the economy is in the same situation as in the
20Eichengreen (1999) and Kenen (2001) argue that the IMF should provide an incentive
for countries to adopt the clause by indicating that it is prepared to lend more generously to
sovereigns that have included a collective action provision in their debts.
35dilutable r-debt case analyzed in section 6. The country’s welfare is lower than
when dilution can be mitigated by n-debt (which is precisely why a sovereign is
issuing some n-debt in equilibrium).
Absent externalities, asymmetric information, or political agency problems,
that would distort the sovereign’s choice of debt structure ex-ante, there can
be no ex-ante beneﬁti ni n ﬂuencing the sovereign’s choice through a tax and
subsidy scheme. Such a policy would not only raise the cost of borrowing, as
has been commonly argued, but also result in excessive borrowing and default
costs because of debt dilution21.
8.2 The statutory approach
Those who favor a more interventionist policy, modeled on existing practice
in corporate bankruptcy, believe that the introduction of CACs in sovereign
bond issues can only facilitate debt restructuring in a very limited way. They
believe that the contractual approach will neither do much to reduce uncer-
tainty surrounding the resolution of debt crises nor signiﬁcantly limit gaming
behavior by vulture funds and the like. The notion of a bankruptcy regime
for sovereigns has for the ﬁrst time been seriously considered by the interna-
tional community in 2002, following the proposal by Anne Krueger (2002), the
I.M.F.’s deputy managing director, for the establishment of a Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM)22. Following over a year of intensive debate
and consultation, this project failed to gain the full support of the international
community, partly due to criticisms by the investor community and some schol-
ars that its implementation would unduly weaken creditor rights and undermine
the sovereign debt market (Institute of International Finance, 2002 ; Shleifer,
21To be fair to the advocates of intervention to facilitate debt restructuring, there are likely
to be political agency problems in reality, and the availability of I.M.F. programs per se
induces even further distortions towards hard sovereign debt.
22The notion of a “bankruptcy court for sovereigns" has a long history that goes back
to Adam Smith. It has been popularized in the 1990s by Sachs (1995). See Rogoﬀ and
Zettelmeyer (2002) for a review of the recent developments on this proposal.
362003).
Our analysis underscores some of these concerns. If the bankruptcy regime
only facilitates sovereign debt restructuring by coordinating creditors23 this
would be equivalent in our model to forcing debt to be more renegotiation-
friendly and would be welfare-reducing.
However, a sovereign bankruptcy institution could also enforce debt senior-
ity and priority, as is the case for corporate bankruptcy. Such an institution
would then address the underlying ineﬃciency in sovereign debt more eﬀectively
than the contractual approach. By replacing de facto seniority prevailing under
laissez-faire with a de jure seniority a sovereign bankruptcy mechanism could
result in substantial eﬃciency improvements. In our model a time-based priority
rule where early lenders (who have lent in period 0) are senior to later lenders
(who are lending in period 1) would lead to a Pareto improvement.
For concreteness, consider the sovereign debt restructuring procedure where
all creditors are required to delegate renegotiation authority to a creditor com-
mittee, who has the exclusive right to make a restructuring proposal ˆ η (that is,
a representative of creditors makes a take-or-leave oﬀer to the sovereign)24.T h e
sovereign can only accept or reject the oﬀer. If the sovereign rejects the oﬀer
the restructuring game ends, with the sovereign getting y2(1 −γ) and creditors
getting no debt repayment25. If the sovereign accepts the oﬀer his payoﬀ is
23This is how the case for the statutory approach has generally been made by its proponents
(see, e.g., Krueger, 2002). Haldane et al (2003) argue that the main advantage of the statutory
approach relative to the contractual one is that it facilitates the negotiation in a context of
asymmetric information.
24Note that creditor exclusivity in the initiation of a restructuring oﬀer is not what the
SDRM (2003) plan proposed by the IMF envisages. On the contrary, the IMF plan only
allows for debtor initiation and even gives the debtor discretion on which debts to include and
which to exclude. Not surprisingly the IMF plan on this dimension further fuelled concerns
on weakening creditor protections and excessively strengthening sovereign debtor’s hands.
25An alternative end-game could be to let the sovereign revert back to uncoordinated renego-
tiations with creditors. The sovereign’s payoﬀ in that case would be unchanged but creditors’
payoﬀs could be higher, with n-creditors again beneﬁting from their higher de facto seniority.
It would seem that under this alternative end-game incentives towards the introduction of de
facto seniority may still be present. But this is not the case under the procedure we described,
where a creditor committee makes a take-it-or-leave it oﬀer ˆ η. This would only be true if n-
37(1 − ρ)y2 − ˆ η and creditors get ˆ η. Creditors would then collectively conceed
a“ h a i r c u t ”o f
D2−ˆ η
D2 .T h e r e p a y m e n t ˆ η the sovereign agrees to make is then
distributed among creditors according to absolute priority, with priority based
on a ﬁrst-in-time issuance rule. That is, for a given debt D2 =( D02 + D12),
the holders of the debt claim D12 would not recover anything out of the agreed
repayment ˆ η until the holders of the debt D02 are paid in full.
Note that the enforcement of this rule would entirely eliminate the sov-
ereign’s incentives to dilute outstanding debt D02 at time t =1 . Therefore, a
sovereign bankruptcy procedure along the lines outlined above would eliminate
the need for initial creditors to make their debt claim diﬃcult to restructure.
They would then optimally choose to issue only r-debt at t =0 ,s ot h a ta
Pareto improvement would result at t =0 . We emphasize this conclusion in the
proposition below:
Proposition 9 Under a perfectly enforceable de jure priority rule for sovereign
debt a country can achieve an optimal debt structure which puts its welfare at
the (commitment) ﬁrst-best.
Proof. See discussion above.
The above highly simpliﬁed procedure is, of course, an idealization that
works in the context of our simple model. Real world sovereign debt restruc-
turings are much more complex and the diﬃcult policy question to be resolved
is how priority can be legally enforced for sovereign debt. One way along the
lines of the simple procedure above proposed in Bolton and Skeel (2004) is to
have the court enforce a ﬁrst-in-time rule through a cram-down rule adapted to
ﬁt the sovereign debt context. Another possible way, proposed by Zettelmeyer
creditors also had a veto right in the sovereign debt restructuring procedure and could insist
on getting their outside option payoﬀ. Interestingly, even if the procedure were to grant such
a veto right it would still bring about an ex-post and ex-ante eﬃciency improvement, as it
would be able to overcome the non-renegotiation constraint of n-debt.
38(2003) is to have courts enforce subordination clauses in sovereign debt issues.
The idea is to give senior claim-holders the right to recover payment from junior
claimholders, who have been able to extract a restructuring agreement which vi-
olates the priority ordering. One potential advantage of Zettelmeyer’s proposal
is that it could in principle be implemented independently of the establishment
of a statutory regime. A possible drawback, however, is that it imposes a po-
tentially onerous monitoring requirement on creditors, who need to be aware of
subordination clauses in pre-existing debt. In addition, the statutory solution
allows more ﬂexibility in the application of the seniority rule–a ﬂexibility that
might be desirable for reasons explained in the following section.
8.3 Optimal dilution
One concern one might have with the strict enforcement of a time-based priority
rule is that it may give rise to a debt overhang problem and put the sovereign
in a position ex post where it cannot borrow to ﬁnance valuable investment
because it has already accumulated too much debt. As a way of reducing this
risk it may be desirable even from an ex ante perspective to allow for some debt
dilution26. Alternatively, it may be desirable to allow for deviations from an
absolute priority rule under the sovereign bankruptcy regime, as is the case in
corporate bankruptcy.
We explore this idea in this section by introducing a plausible new feature
into the model. We shall allow the sovereign to take an action in period 1 that
can reduce the negative impact of a default on the domestic economy. This
action increases domestic output by (α + β)y2 in period 2, but requires an
expenditure of αy2 in period 1. For simplicity, we assume that this increase
in domestic output cannot be pledged in repayment to foreign creditors. We
further assume that the country is not able to ﬁnance the new expenditure with
26Diamond (1993) presents a model in which dilution might play a useful role as a buﬀer
against negative shocks.
39period 1 o u t p u t ,s ot h a ti th a st ob o r r o wαy2 in period 1.
If the bankruptcy court gives absolute priority to the period 0 lenders, then
the sovereign cannot raise any new funds in period 1. For the country to be
able to ﬁnance the welfare-enhancing expenditure in period 1, the bankruptcy
regime would have to violate the seniority of early lenders.
Suppose that the bankruptcy court grants protection to a sovereign only if
it is insolvent (when γy2 <D r
02) and suppose that the bankruptcy court grants
higher priority to new lenders to cover the expenditure αy2.
Under these assumptions the country’s budget constraint and ex ante welfare
are given by respectively
















The expected cost of dilution arising from the new priority lending in period 1 is
captured in the term in α in the ﬁrst equation. Because of this cost the sovereign
must promise a larger Dr
02 to ﬁnance the same g, and therefore faces a higher
probability of default (for the same level of borrowing g). The second equation
captures the welfare beneﬁt of dilution (the term in β). If β is larger than
ρ–that is, if the period 1 expenditure more than oﬀsets the deadweight cost of
default–conditional dilution unambiguously increases the country’s welfare. If
β is smaller than ρ, the welfare impact of conditional dilution is ambiguous, but
remains positive if α is suﬃciently small relative to β.
Proposition 10 It may be optimal for the bankruptcy court to grant seniority
to post-default lenders over pre-default lenders.
Proof. See discussion above.
40The right of dilution given to the court can be interpreted as the analog
of debtor-in-possession lending in corporate bankruptcy regimes. Note that the
original creditors suﬀer from the dilution so they would never vote for it, if given
the opportunity. The optimal conditional dilution policy cannot, therefore,
be implemented simply by coordinating creditors ex post. The court must be
granted the discretionary power of deviating from the absolute priority rule.
9 Concluding Comments
This paper presents a model of sovereign debt crises which, although stylized, is
versatile enough to lend itself to the analysis of a number of questions that have
been discussed in the recent debates on the international ﬁnancial architecture.
The endogeneity of the debt structure implies that the normative analysis has
to go beyond statements that debt workouts should be made more orderly and
sovereign creditors coordinated in a crisis. These statements are correct in an
ex post sense, but from an ex ante perspective dangerous liability structures
arise for a reason.
At the same time, our analysis does not support a Panglossian view that
sovereign debt contracts are eﬃcient ex ante and that there is no scope for
welfare-improving reforms. We do ﬁnd that sovereign debt might be excessively
diﬃcult to restructure under laissez-faire (even from an ex ante point of view),
and that public intervention is warranted. Our model points to a sovereign
debt restructuring mechanism that shares many features with corporate bank-
ruptcy regimes. In particular, it should not only solve the classical common
pool problem between creditors but also establish a seniority structure between
the pre-default lenders, and enjoy some discretion in granting super-seniority to
post-default lenders.
This model abstracted from a number of issues that may be quite relevant in
41the real world. One such issue is debt maturity. Short-term debt is another way
of forestalling dilution: it allows creditors to price any dilution in the interest
rate at which they roll over their claims, or punish the sovereign by a debt
rollover crisis when dilution becomes too large. However, short-term debt could
make sovereigns excessively vulnerable to debt rollover crises (Jeanne, 2004).
Our model suggests that if the maturity of sovereign debt were excessively short
because of the nonexclusivity problem, then this ineﬃciency could be taken care
of by a statutory bankruptcy mechanism making long-term debt senior to short-
term debt. The normative implications, thus, would be close to those we have
obtained here (a conjecture that we plan to explore further in future work).
The analysis could be extended to take other agency problems than those
between debtors and creditors into consideration, in particular political agency
problems between citizens and their governments. In this paper it was unam-
biguously optimal to relax the credit constraints in the international debt mar-
ket because governments were assumed to be benevolent. The welfare analysis
would be very diﬀerent if decisions were taken by self-interested policymakers
who do not maximize domestic welfare. Rationing policymakers, then, could
increase the welfare of their citizens.
.
42APPENDIX
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
We assume that condition (3) is satisﬁed (the proof is easy to extend to the
case where it is not). Then creditors as a whole receive D2 = Dr
2+Dn
2 under full
r e p a y m e n t( c a s e( i )o fP r o p o s i t i o n1 ) ,λy2 under partial repayment (case (ii)),
and zero repayment if there is a full default (case (iii)). The lenders’ binding




2 /λ λy2f2(y2)dy2 +
R +∞
D2/γ D2f2(y2)dy2. (13)
The deadweight cost of default is equal to ρy2 if default is partial, to which one









2 >λ y , reducing Dn
2 below λy and increasing Dr
2 so as to keep their sum
D2 constant is optimal since it has the eﬀect of increasing g and reducing E0( ).
Thus the optimal debt structure has Dn
2 <λ y(the inequality does not need to
be strict if f2(·) does not have a probability mass in y).
The sovereign chooses g to maximize




where D2(g) is the solution to (13) in which Dn






If g∗ <γ y ,t h es o v e r e i g nc a nﬁnance the ﬁrst-best level of expenditure with a
default-free debt structure by issuing D2 = g∗. By contrast, if g∗ >γ y ,t h e n
27Such equations can have multiple solutions, in which case the economically relevant solu-
tion is the lowest one.
43the sovereign must incur a strictly positive probability of default to ﬁnance g∗.






P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
Assume that Dn
02 ≤ λy, so that the probability of a full default is equal
to zero. We know that because of (11), the sovereign issues some r-debt that
is diluted in equilibrium and that g<g ∗.I f Dn
02 is strictly below λy,t h e na
small (ﬁrst-order) increase in n-debt δ would be repaid with probability 1, and
g could be increased by δ at no cost. Dn
02, therefore, must be at least equal to
λy. Assume that Dn
02 is equal to λy, and again let us increase it by ﬁrst-order





which is the probability that y2 falls between Dn
02/λ and (Dn
02 + δ)/λ.
The small increase in Dn
02 has two eﬀects. First, since δ is almost always fully
repaid (to a ﬁrst-order approximation), it allows the government to increase g
by δ . The resulting increase in welfare is,
(V 0(g) − 1)δ,
which is strictly positive if g is strictly below the ﬁrst-best level.
Second, the deadweight loss increases by the amount of the sanction if there






44i.e., the probability of a full default times the amount of the sanction when
output is equal to y. Thus, it is optimal to issue some n-debt up to a level
where there is a strictly positive probability of full default if and only if,





V 0(g) − 1 >f 2(y)y. (16)
This condition is necessarily satisﬁed if f2(y)y =0 .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7


































Equation (17) uses the facts that Dn
02 is repaid if it is smaller than λy2 (Propo-
sition 1) and that Dr
02 is repaid if it is smaller than ρy2, and is otherwise com-
pletely diluted (Proposition 3). Equation (18) uses that the deadweight loss
amounts to ρy2 if y2 <D r
02/ρ, to which one must add λy2 if y2 <D n
02/λ.
Let us increase Dn
02 by a small amount dDn
02 and decrease Dr
02 by a small
amount dDr

































x f2(y)dy/(xf2(x)). Assumption A1 implies that dg > 0,s oi t
is possible to increase g without increasing the expected deadweight loss. So a
debt structure with 0 <D n
02/λ < Dr
02/ρ cannot be optimal. This proves that
condition (12) is necessary.
Suppose now that (12) is satisﬁed. Then repayment occurs if and only if
Dn
02 +Dr
02 is smaller than γy2.I fDn
02 +Dr
02 is strictly larger than γy2,t h e r ei s















Both g and E0( ) depend on the sum D2 ≡ Dn
02 + Dr
02. This sum is uniquely
determined in equilibrium, not the components Dn
02 and Dr
02,w h i c hc a nb e
chosen arbitrarily subject to the zero-proﬁt condition for lenders. One particular
solution is Dn
02 = D2,D r
02 =0 , i.e., pure n-debt. This proves the proposition.
Ac o u n t e r e x a m p l e
We now highlight that if the distribution of y2 does not satisfy assumption
A1, it may be optimal for the government to issue some r-debt in equilibrium.




y2 = yL with probability pL
y2 = yH with probability pH.
In this example the sovereign is obviously indiﬀerent between any combina-
tion of r-debt and n-debt as long as the debt remains default-free. That is, for
46any amount g raised that is less than or equal to ρyL the optimal debt structure
is indeterminate. For
ρyL <g≤ γyL
the sovereign strictly prefers n-debt over r-debt, as n-debt is safe and has face
value Dn = g, while r-debt is either risky or not sustainable. Indeed, for g>ρ y L
r-debt leads to a default and full dilution in state yL. The face value of the risky
r-debt is then given by Dr(g)=
g
pH when it is sustainable (r-debt is sustainable
if and only if
g
pH ≤ ρyH).
However, for γyL <g≤ ρpHyH r-debt is preferred to n-debt since both forms
of debt are now risky and both lead to default in state yL, but n-debt involves the
higher expected deadweight cost of default of pLγyL. In this situation the cost of
borrowing g under respectively r-debt and n-debt (in terms of expected foregone
future consumption) is given by Cr(g)=pLρyL + g and Cn(g)=pLγyL + g.
As can be easily veriﬁed, the sovereign is indiﬀerent between borrowing all its
debt in the form or r-debt here, or borrowing any amount up to λyL in safe
n-debt and the remainder g−λyL in r-debt. However, if g is raised entirely with
r-debt, this debt is sustainable as only if
g
pH ≤ ρyH. On the other hand, if only






pHλyL + g − λyL ≤ γpHyH.
Notice that since the RHS of this inequality is higher and the LHS lower than
in the inequality g ≤ ρpHyH, issuing a mix of n-debt and r-debt allows the
sovereign to issue more debt. More precisely, when γyL ≤ ρpHyH <gand
g ≤ pHγyH +(1−pH)λyL then it is strictly optimal for the sovereign to borrow
with a mixture of r-debt and n-debt.
47Finally, for pHγyH +(1−pH)λyL <g≤ γyH only n-debt is sustainable and
is therefore preferred (any borrowing requirement g>γ y H cannot be funded
with either form of debt in this example).
In short, this example illustrates how for low borrowing requirements n-debt
may weakly dominate r-debt, for intermediate g the ranking between the two
forms of debt is reversed, while for high borrowing requirements it is again
n-debt that is preferable.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8
















and the expected deadweight loss is still given by equation (18).
Going through the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 7, one can show
































y(1 − F2 (y))
¶
F2(·) denotes the cdf of y2,a n dσ was substituted out using τDn
02 = σDr
02.
One can check that m is decreasing with Dn
02 and increasing with Dr
02 (the
latter because Dr
02 (1 − F2 (Dr
02/ρ)) is increasing with Dr
02 in an eﬃcient debt
structure). We know from Proposition 7 that m is strictly positive if τ =0and
there is dilution (Dn
02/λ < Dr
02/ρ). Increasing τ reduces m, which becomes neg-
ative for large enough values of τ. It follows that for large enough τ the optimal
debt structure (with m =0 ) is associated with some dilution in equilibrium.
48The comparative static impact of τ on the equilibrium debt structure can be
derived graphically as follows. The equilibrium relationship m =0deﬁnes an
upward sloping locus in the space (Dr
02,Dn
02) (see Figure 5). The equilibrium
is at the intersection between this curve and the locus (20), which is downward
sloping. An increase in the tax rate on n-debt, τ,s h i f t st h el o c u sm =0
downward, and so reduces the amount of n-debt and increases that of r-debt.
In equilibrium, the sovereign’s budget constraint is still given by (17) since
the tax and the subsidy cancel each other. The tax increases the agency cost of
debt E0( ) for any given level of g, or equivalently reduces the level of g that
can be achieved by for a given agency cost E0( ). It follows that the tax reduces
domestic welfare in equilibrium.
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